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GIFT OF ENGAGEMENT

RING.-Appellant gave his own diamond to his fiancee as an engagement ring. The ring was later stolen and shortly after appellant
refused to carry out the marriage agreement. Appellant had taken
out an "all risk" policy when he was in possession of the diamond,
which at that time was in a man's setting. He failed to notify respondent insurance company of the fact that the diamond had been
given to his fiancee as an engagement ring until this claim was
made under policy. Held, a man's conditional gift of a diamond
engagement ring to his fiancee conferred title to the ring at time of
its delivery to her and the man thereafter had no insurable interest
in the ring and could not recover under an "all risk" policy, the value
of ring which was later stolen from his fiancee. Ludeau v. Phoenix
Ins. Co. et al., - Tex. -, 204 S. W. 2d 1008 (1947).
It is a general rule of insurance law that the person taking out
a policy must have an insurable interest in the subject matter of the
insurance and if such interest is lacking, the policy is void." In life
insurance this insurable interest is required generally only at time
policy is taken out. 2 Where personal property is insured, the contract, however, is one of indemnity and the insurable interest must
exist at the time of the loss. A person usually has an insurable interest in the subject matter insured where he will derive pecuniary
benefit or advantage from its preservation, or will suffer pecuniary
loss or damage from its destruction by the happening of the event
insured against.3 Persons held to have an insurable interest in property include persons having the custody and responsibility for the
property, such as bailees, 4 executors or administrators, 5 pledgors and
pledgees, 6 an assignor for the benefit of creditors, 7 a lessor,8 a lessee, 9
a mortgagor,'1 a remainderman" and a stockholder. 12 It has also
been held that a woman has an insurable interest in the life of
her fiance.' 3
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In the instant case appellant contends that the title to the ring
was either wholly in him or that he had an insurable interest therein
as the ring had been presented to her as an "engagement ring," and
that it was no ordinary gift but at most a mere pledge or conditional
presentment, conditioned upon their consununating their engagement
to be married. The court maintained, however, that it is an established principle that even a conditional gift confers a title to the object
given at the time of its delivery into the possession of the donee 14
and denied recovery on the ground that appellant had no insurable
interest at time of the loss.
It is felt that this decision, holding that a man does not have an
insurable interest in the engagement ring which he gives to his fiancee,
should not be followed. Such an implication must be based upon
facts and circumstances of the particular case with particular emphasis upon whether the gift was given as a conditional gift expressly
and which party, with or without fault, broke the engagement.
J. H. S.

INSURANCE-SUBROGATION-ANTI-AsIGNMENT AcT-FEDERAL

AcT.-Plaintiffs sue Federal Government for personal
injuries and property damage sustained when their auto was involved
in a collision with a United States Army truck. It is alleged that the
accident was caused by the negligence of the soldier operator of the
Federal vehicle. Plaintiff insurance company paid the amount of the
property damage sustained to the automobile in question under a
policy of indemnity insurance, which policy included coverage for
collision damage. The policy contained the standard subrogation
clause in the event that payments under it should be made to the
assured. Held, tort claims for damages resulting from collision between an auto and an Army truck are not within the statute prohibiting the assignment of any claim upon the United States. Hill
v. United States, 74 F. Supp. 129 (N. D. Tex. 1947).
The precise point ruled on in the case was raised when the
United States attorney filed a motion to dismiss the insurance company's subrogation claim on the ground that the Tort Claims Act
does not authorize the maintenance of suits upon derivative claims,
and that such a claim is prohibited under the Anti-Assignment Act.1
The court held that the purpose of the Anti-Assignment Act is
to restrict voluntary assignments for the payment of claims against
the United States Government, so as to better keep a steady status
thereof, and thereby facilitate the undistracted consideration, deterTORT CLAIMS

24 Urbanus v. Burns, 300 Ill. App. 207, 20 N. E. 2d 869 (1939).
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STAT. 411 (1908), as amended, 31 U. S, C. §203 (1940).

